1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

In December 2019, respiratory illness clusters caused by a novel coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) emerged in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province, China. The World Health Organization (WHO) named the disease COVID-19. The pandemic quickly spread from Wuhan to the rest of mainland China: As of July 16, 2020, official statistics show that COVID-19 had caused a cumulative number of 83,622 infections and 4,634 fatalities in China.[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} The need for social distancing and lockdowns has caused substantial collateral economic damage. COVID-19 initially caused a negative supply shock by forcing firms to shut down, which disrupted international supply chains. Moreover, the pandemic, through its negative impact on agent expectations of future income growth, induced a demand-driven recession. Weak aggregate demand, in turn, depressed the incentives of firms to invest. The massive spike in uncertainty added wait-and-see responses by consumers and firms to a shaky world economy, and valuations in global financial markets imploded. These reactions reflect profound uncertainties about the path of the COVID-19 virus and the length of time the global economy could remain shuttered, or even induce a supply-demand doom loop.[2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"}

Which policy interventions can prevent the economy from sliding into a prolonged recession? How has monetary and fiscal policy responded to the coronavirus-induced disruptions? As the global recession gains force, almost all governments around the world have implemented measures that ranged from monetary easing to measures keeping financial markets operating and low interest rates. They have boosted fiscal spending to counteract the sharp drop-off in economic activity. In addition, central banks have cut interest rates and launched massive new quantitative-easing schemes to contain government borrowing costs.[3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"}

Against the background of this difficult economic situation, this paper analyzes and quantifies the monetary policy response of the People's Bank of China (PBoC) to the COVID-19 crisis by employing a dynamic-factor modelling framework. Our strategy represents a refinement of the approach laid out by [@bib24], and includes the PBoC's numerous earmarked (and sometimes arcane) monetary stimulus tools. Given China's prominence in the world economy, Beijing's economic policy course is followed closely.

Several studies have examined the course of China's monetary policy and/or Chinese monetary policy shocks, including [@bib26]; [@bib32]; [@bib40]; and [@bib48], [@bib49]. These papers use diverse empirical methodologies to estimate China's monetary policy stance, and obtain results quite consistent with ours.[4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"} A distinctive contribution of our paper is that we provide evidence for the PBoC's policy response to the pandemic-induced 2020 downturn. The estimated nowcasting indicator of Chinese monetary policy presented here is thus unrivaled in the literature.

The paper proceeds as follows. The economic impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese economy and the PBoC's monetary policy response are described in Section [2](#sec2){ref-type="sec"}. In Section [3](#sec3){ref-type="sec"}, we present our dynamic-factor modelling framework. Section [4](#sec4){ref-type="sec"} reports the estimation results and evaluates China's monetary policy response, and Section [5](#sec5){ref-type="sec"} presents our conclusions and policy implications.

2. The impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese economy and the PBoC's monetary policy response {#sec2}
========================================================================================

The Chinese government's distancing policies aimed at containing infections and saving lives prevented firms from operating (triggering a supply-side recession) and consumers from consuming (triggering a demand-side recession). In other words, the flattening of the infection curve inevitably steepened the macroeconomic recession curve. While this collateral damage was quite predictable, the extreme speed at which the crisis unfolded was unforeseen. Carmen [@bib42] Rogoff asserted in their 2009 book on the Great Recession, *This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*, that we had encountered a situation without historical precedent. Only a decade later, we see the basis for assessing yet another paradigm-breaking economic upheaval. Perhaps the sequel, *The COVID-19 Crisis is Different: Global Recession in the Wake of a Pandemic*, is already in the works.[5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"} In any case, the knock-on effects of the pandemic on the Chinese economy are illustrated by the various indicators in [Figures 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} and [2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} .Figure 1The mainland Chinese economy halts and begins to recover.Figure 1Figure 2China's quarterly real GDP growth rates (%)Figure 2

**Notes:** The OECD business confidence indicator for China provides information on future expectations. It is based on opinion surveys on expected production, booked orders, and stocks of finished goods in the industry sector. The series is amplitude adjusted and 100 means the long-term average. (<https://data.oecd.org/leadind/business-confidence-index-bci.htm>). The RWI/ISL Container Throughput Index includes the information on container throughput in 91 international ports and accounts for about 60 percent of the global container throughput (<https://www.isl.org/en/containerindex/june-2020>). Foreign trade figures are in US dollars. The dates of the Chinese Lunar New Year falls at different times depending on the year. Considering the year-on-year growth rate of some macroeconomic series (industrial output, retail sales, fixed asset investment and trade) are distorted by the this New Year holiday effect, National Bureau of Statistics of China only reported the aggregate figures for first two months. Data sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), Chinese Customs, Shanghai Stock Exchange, OECD, and the Institute for Shipping Economics and Logistics (ISL).

**Data source:** China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

[Figures 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} and [2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} reveal that the COVID-19 shock quickly cascaded through the economy, morphing into an unparalleled downturn simultaneously impeding demand and supply (slumps of industrial production, retail sales, the purchasing manager indices, the business confidence indices, fixed asset investment and foreign trade in first three months of 2020). In the 2^nd^ quarter the Chinese economy then started to rebound, albeit rather uneven as the supply recovery is stronger than demand, and investment is stronger than consumption. Retail sales in particular are still rather subdued, as people continue to practice social distancing. The only bright spot is online retail.

This pattern is also apparent in GDP growth. [Figure 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} shows a historic contraction in the first quarter, with Chinese GDP shrinking 6.8% from the same period a year ago. GDP then reverted to expand 3.2% in the second quarter from a year ago. In the first half however, China's GDP still declined by 1.6% year on year. That is all to say: China's rebound from the pandemic lockdown is impressive, but is not yet back to normal.

For policymakers, the biggest surprise has been the depth of slump. The data for January and February 2020 show that real industrial output and nominal retail sales were down by 13.5% and 20.5%, respectively. The official seasonally adjusted purchasing manager index (PMI) and the OECD business confidence index for China fell to its lowest level since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Within the survey indices, the non-manufacturing sectors suffered the greatest losses. These three expectation-driven indicators suggest extreme stress and illustrate that market participants were increasingly worried that the public health crisis would become a broad-reaching financial crisis. Meanwhile, the seasonally adjusted RWI/ISL Container Throughput Index dropped by 9.9 points in February -- the largest monthly decline ever recorded. The driving force was the decline in sharp declines in container handling at Chinese ports and ports on the US west coast, a textbook illustration of how trade is the conduit through which a pandemic-induced slowdown passes from one country to another.

The latest June figures give a somewhat mixed picture. Real industrial output rose 4.8% in June, nominal retail sales fell 1.8%, and nominal fixed asset investment declined 3.1% in the first half of the year. Exports increased slightly in June as production capacity was gradually restored. Nevertheless, the continued spread of COVID-19 globally adds further strain on China's exporters. While the marked improvement in industrial output, which had suffered a double-digit fall in the first two months of the year, should be noted, regaining consumer confidence as the lockdowns are lifted is increasingly as become the Achilles heel of the rebound. Without a pickup in consumption and private sector spending, worries will persist that China's recovery could lose its momentum.

What are the current forecasts for Chinese economic growth? The latest IMF baseline forecasts for 2020 and 2021 released in June 2020 see GDP growth of 1.0% and 8.2%, respectively (<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020>). The World Bank GDP growth forecasts for 2020 and 2021, which were published in April 2020, are 2.3% and 7.7%, respectively (<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33477/211565-ch01.pdf>).

We offer four comments on these assessments. First, the sudden stop in economic activity should be worse than during the Great Recession.[6](#fn6){ref-type="fn"} Second, both the IMF and World Bank expect China's economic growth will rebound in 2021. Third, the forecasts illustrate China's dwindling effect on global growth. Finally, the timing and shape of the rebound remain highly uncertain.[7](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} In total, this is a dramatic deterioration in outlook from the forecasts at the end of 2019. For example, the IMF's semi-annual *World Economic Outlook*, released in October 2019, predicted a real GDP growth rate of 5.8% for China in 2020 (<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx>).

This highlights the challenges for policymakers posed by the pandemic. While the immediate impact of the public health crisis can be observed, the medium and longer-term effects are difficult to predict. Will China experience a short-lockdown, quick-snapback V-shaped recovery, or will the coronavirus lead to an anemic rebound that looks like a U? While the V-shaped recession has a pointed trough, troughs are more elevated and prolonged in U-shaped recoveries. How much of the economic damage wrought by the temporary shutdown will last even after Chinese firms reopen?

There are also potential second and third waves of infection to consider. Domestic and global infections still pose a threat that could well trigger further waves of infection in China that obviates containment measures and lockdowns. This would cause a double-dip, or W-shaped recession and recovery. An ex-ante estimate of the severity and length of the pandemic is challenging to say the least.

Amidst the considerable uncertainties, the PBoC took a number of policy measures designed to combat the economic repercussions of the pandemic. The chronological sequence of Chinese monetary policy measures introduced from 31 January - 16 July 2020 are summarised in [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} .Table 1Monetary policy measures implemented from 31 January - 16 July 2020Table 1DateDecision/action31.1PBoC announces that it was implementing a monetary policy package (including open market operations, standing lending facility, central bank lending, and central bank discount) to provide sufficient liquidity to the market.3.2PBoC injects RMB 1.2 trillion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations, (lowering repo rates by 10 basis points).4.2PBoC injects RMB 500 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations.7.2PBoC announces plans to support bond issuance by financial institutions for epidemic prevention and control.7.2PBoC announces plans to set up RMB 300 billion in special central bank lending (relending) to provide low-cost funds for banking lending supporting epidemic prevention and control. The central government commits to subsidizing 50% of business interest payments to ensure actual financing costs below 1.6%.10.2PBoC injects RMB 900 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations.11.2PBoC injects RMB 100 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations.17.2PBoC injects RMB 100 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations, as well as RMB 200 billion in medium-term (1-year) liquidity through MLF operations (with 10-bp cut in MLF rate).20.2PBoC lowered 1-year loan prime rate by 10 bps and 5-year loan prime rate by 5 bps.25.2State Council decides to increase the PBoC's relending and rediscount quota by RMB 500 billion for bank lending to support SMEs, as well as lower relending rate by 25 bps to 2.5%.28.2State Council decides to guide financial institutions to issue extra-low-interest loans with a quota of RMB 300 billion for self-employed businesses.1.3China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission urges financial institutions to defer loan principal and interest repayments.3.3State Council orders policy banks to add a RMB 350 billion special credit quota for loans issuing to SMEs at preferential rates.13.3PBoC announces earmarked required reserve ratio (RRR) cuts of 50 to 100 basis for loans to SMEs on 16 March, subject to banks' performance. Cuts set to release RMB 550 billion in long-term funds.16.3PBoC injects RMB 100 billion in medium-term liquidity through MLF operations.30.3PBoC injects RMB 50 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations, including a lowering of repo rates by 20 basis points.31.3PBoC injects RMB 20 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations.31.3State Council decides to (i) increase the PBoC's relending and rediscount quota by RMB 1 trillion to support SMEs; (ii) order PBoC to cut RRR for small and medium-sized banks; and (iii) reinforce the PBoC's support for bond financing.3.4PBoC announces cut in RRR for small and medium banks, effective 15 April and 15 May, by 5 basis points each time. Release of RMB 400 billion to the market expected. PBoC also announces a cut in the excess deposit reserve interest rate of financial institutions in the central bank from 0.72% to 0.35%, effective 7 April.15.4PBoC injects RMB 100 billion in medium-term liquidity through MLF operations (with 20 bp cut in MLF rate).20.4PBoC lower 1-year loan prime rate by 20 bps and 5-year loan prime rate by 10 bps.15.5PBoC injects RMB 100 billion in medium-term liquidity through MLF operations.26.5PBoC injects RMB 670 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations in 4 trading days from 26 May to 29 May.1.6PBoC announces plans to set up RMB 400 billion in special central bank lending (relending) to provide low-cost funds for banking lending supporting SMEs.4.6PBoC injects RMB 1.54 trillion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations in 13 trading days between 4 June and 28 June.15.6PBoC injects RMB 200 billion in medium-term liquidity through MLF operations.1.7PBoC lower relending and rediscount rates by 25 bps.13.7PBoC injects RMB 130 billion in liquidity into the banking sector through reverse repo operations in 3 trading days between 13 July and 16 July.15.7PBoC injects RMB 400 billion in medium-term liquidity through MLF operations.[^1]

At first glance, we see the PBoC has unveiled an unprecedented set of measures intended to ensure China's commercial banks maintain liquidity access and credit provision during the COVID-19 crisis. The chronological sequence in [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} further shows that the Chinese monetary policy response was not a one-off reaction, but a successive series of easing actions. Since some of the listed open market policy measures are regular and limited in duration, it is interesting to determine the extra liquidity triggered by the pandemic crisis. The COVID-19 gross liquidity injection of all operations appears to be on the order of RMB 8 trillion for the February-June period.[8](#fn8){ref-type="fn"} The following section provides a quantitative assessment of the monetary policy measures taken.

3. Methodology and Data {#sec3}
=======================

Judging the overall monetary policy stance in China at any given point in time is difficult due to the vast number of measures which operate through numerous channels. In light of this fact, a dynamic factor model is presented below to gauge the overall stance on monetary policy in China, which the methodology allows us to use a single model with incorporating dimension reduction and variable selection to construct a single and intuitive indicator. In specifying the dynamic factor model, it must be borne in mind that China's monetary policy toolkit has evolved over time. Before diving into the factor modelling approach, we therefore briefly review China's monetary policy reforms in recent years and the resulting contours of the current Chinese monetary policy landscape.

In the last decade, the PBoC has upgraded its monetary policy framework to a multiple instrument toolkit. With regard to the price-based instruments, the PBoC introduced a new corridor system of interest rates. Within the interest rate band, the policy rate is the pledged 7-day interbank market rate applied to all financial institutions (DR007). The Standing Lending Facility (SLF, a lending facility for funding within a month) serve as the upper bound of the band, while the interest rate on excess reserves (as a deposit facility tool) acts as the lower bound of the corridor is. In practice, the PBoC steers a wide interest rate corridor, anchored by the seven-day reverse-repurchase rate DR007 (rate at which banks lend to each other) and the Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF, the open market facility providing funding from three months to a year). Meanwhile the one-year loan prime rate LPR, the rate for lending to prime customers, became the new standard for all loans.[9](#fn9){ref-type="fn"}

The policy instrument toolkit also include a set of quantity-based instruments, including the reserve requirement ratio and other lending facilities, like SLF, the Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF, providing funding from three months to a year) and the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL, aiming at the nation's three policy banks: China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export-Import Bank of China).

Against the background of this multitude of price-based and quantity-based monetary policy instruments, the following five variables summarize the monetary policy tools used by the PBoC: (i) the 7-day pledged repo rate (DR007); (ii) the required reserve ratio (RRR); (iii) the PBoC's open market operations, including standing lending facility (SLF), relending and rediscount (e.g. actual amount of loans granted within the announced total of RMB 2.4 trillion in relending and rediscount quota since February); (iv) the medium-term lending facility (MLF); and (v) pledged supplemental lending (PSL). The amount of the targeted MLF stimulus measures is included in the variable Net OMO withdrawal/total loans (*t* - 1). [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} summarizes these five variables and their descriptive statistics.Table 2Variables summarizing the PBoC's current monetary policy toolkitTable 2VariableData descriptionData source(a) Data DescriptionChanges in the 7-day pledged repo rateChanges in the monthly average of the 7-day pledged repo rate for depository institutions in the interbank market (DR007).National Interbank Funding CenterChanges in required reserve ratio (RRR)Changes in the overall required reserve ratio (RRR) for the banking sector within the month. The overall RRR is estimated as 75%\*RRR for large banks + 25%\*RRR for small and medium-sized banks.PBoCNet OMO withdrawal\
/ total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$Net amount of liquidity withdrawn from the banking sector during the month through the open market operations (OMO). The net amount of funds withdrawn in other items in the PBoC's claims on the banks, e.g. standing lending facility (SLF), relending, and rediscount, is included in this variable.PBoCNet MLF withdrawal / total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$Net amount of liquidity withdrawn from the banking sector during the month through the medium-term lending facility (MLF).PBoCNet PSL withdrawal / total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$Net amount of liquidity withdrawn from the banking sector during the month through the pledged supplemental lending (PSL).PBoC(b) Descriptive statistics (May 2012 -- Jun 2020)VariableObs.MeanSDMinQ1MedianQ3MaxChanges in the 7-day pledged repo rate98-0.01740.5487-2.8452-0.12150.00140.12463.3732Changes in required reserve ratio (RRR)98-0.08420.2334-1.00000.00000.00000.00000.0000Net OMO withdrawal\
/ total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$98-0.02630.3761-1.5813-0.1907-0.01580.17930.7855Net MLF withdrawal / total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$98-0.03880.2004-0.7167-0.09150.00000.00000.6954Net PSL withdrawal / total loans $\left( {t - 1} \right)$98-0.03500.0413-0.1570-0.0557-0.03030.00000.0300[^2]

Dynamic factor models are used in applied time series econometrics incorporating unobserved variables. Such models are particularly valuable in nowcasting the state of an economy. As with many useful empirical modelling approaches, factor models are extrapolated from data rather than being deduced from theory.[10](#fn10){ref-type="fn"}

A further development of the model in [@bib24] which includes the novel and specific and earmarked monetary policy measures in the COVID-19 pandemic is used below. The Chinese monetary policy stance indicator is based on a common element for the movements of different monetary policy instruments that can be captured by a single underlying, unobservable variable. The number of common factors is determined using the test procedure of [@bib4]. The upshot is that a single common factor is appropriate for the data-generating processes. As a result, our dynamic factor model in first differences is specified as follows:$$\ \Delta y_{i,t} = \beta_{i}\Delta x_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$ $$\ \ \Delta x_{t} = \varphi_{1}\Delta x_{t - 1} + \varphi_{2}\Delta x_{t - 2} + u_{t}$$ $$\ \varepsilon_{i,t} = \rho_{i,1}\varepsilon_{i,t - 1} + \rho_{i,2}\varepsilon_{i,t - 2} + v_{i,t}$$where $\Delta$ is the first-difference operator, $x_{t}$ is the unobserved common component at time *t*, $y_{i}\ \left( {i = 1,\cdots,5} \right)$ are the five monetary policy instruments, $\beta_{i}$ are the factor loadings, $u_{t}$ ∼ iid *N*(0,$\ \sigma_{u}^{2}$), and $v_{i,t}$ ∼ iid *N*(0,$\ \sigma_{i}^{2}$). Furthermore, the error terms are orthogonal. The AR(2) lag structure in equations [(2)](#fd2){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(3)](#fd3){ref-type="disp-formula"} has been chosen to ensure the iid properties of the residuals. Each monetary policy indicator $y_{i,t}$ is demeaned and first-differenced, while the differenced series is assumed as a weakly stationary process that has at least finite second-order moments. In the state-space representation, the measurement equation is written as$$\begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
{\Delta y_{1,t}} \\
{\Delta y_{2,t}} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
{\Delta y_{3,t}} \\
{\Delta y_{4,t}} \\
{\Delta y_{5,t}} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{β}_{1} & \text{0} & 1 \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{β}_{2} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & 1 & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{β}_{3} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
1 & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{β}_{4} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & 1 \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{β}_{5} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\text{0} & \text{0} & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\text{0} & 1 & \text{0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix}\Delta\begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
{\Delta x_{t}} \\
{\Delta x_{t - 1}} \\
\varepsilon_{1,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{1,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{3,t} \\
\varepsilon_{3,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{4,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{4,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix}$$

and the state equation is$$\begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
{\Delta x_{t}} \\
{\Delta x_{t - 1}} \\
\varepsilon_{1,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{1,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{3,t} \\
\varepsilon_{3,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{4,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{4,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\varphi_{1} & \varphi_{2} \\
1 & 0 \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
{\ 0\ \ } & {\ \ 0} \\
{\ 0\ \ } & {\ \ 0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
{0\ } & {\ 0} \\
{0\ } & {\ 0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
\rho_{1,1} & \rho_{1,2} \\
1 & 0 \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \cdots & \begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
{\ \ \ 0\ \ \ } & {\ 0} \\
{\ \ \ 0\ \ \ } & {\ 0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
{\ \ \ 0\ \ \ } & {\ 0} \\
{\ \ \ 0\ \ \ } & {\ 0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
 \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
{0\ } & {\ 0} \\
{0\ } & {\ 0} \\
\end{matrix} & \begin{matrix}
{\ \ \ 0\ } & {\ \ 0} \\
{\ \ \ 0\ } & {\ \ 0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} & \cdots & \begin{matrix}
{\ \rho_{5,1}\ } & \rho_{5,2} \\
{\ \ \ 1\ } & {\ 0} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
{\Delta x_{t - 1}} \\
{\Delta x_{t - 2}} \\
\varepsilon_{1,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{1,t - 2} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{2,t - 2} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{3,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{3,t - 2} \\
\varepsilon_{4,t - 1} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\varepsilon_{4,t - 2} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t - 1} \\
\varepsilon_{5,t - 2} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
u_{t} \\
0 \\
v_{1,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
0 \\
v_{2,t} \\
0 \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
\begin{matrix}
v_{3,t} \\
0 \\
v_{4,t} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\begin{matrix}
0 \\
v_{5,t} \\
0 \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{matrix} \\
\end{bmatrix}$$

The estimation procedure consists of a sequence of four steps. First, the maximum likelihood estimation method is employed to estimate the parameters of the dynamic factor model in equations [(4)](#fd4){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(5)](#fd5){ref-type="disp-formula"}. Second, the current state of the unobserved common factors is obtained by applying the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimate of the unobserved state vector $\beta_{i}$ based on the appropriate information set. The algorithm works in a two-step process. In the prediction step, the Kalman filter produces estimates of the current state variables, along with their uncertainties. Once the outcome of the next measurement is observed, these estimates are updated using a weighted average, with more weight being given to estimates with higher certainty. Third, the monetary policy stance time series ($x_{t}$) is calculated by accumulating the estimated series $\Delta x_{t}$, assuming the initial value $x_{0} = 0$. Finally, the monetary policy stance time series is rescaled to the range from -2 to +2.[11](#fn11){ref-type="fn"}

4. Estimation results and policy evaluation {#sec4}
===========================================

The maximum-likelihood estimation results of the dynamic factor models are given in [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} , while [Figure 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"} shows the resulting indicators. Lower (higher) values of the indicator represent a monetary policy easing (tightening). The baseline indicator only takes into account measures encompassing all banks and the whole economy. The alternative indicator additionally takes into account the earmarked RRR cuts for loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) announced on 13 March 2020 (effective 16 March 2020, see [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}). These loans are intended to help SMEs bear fixed costs such as rent, interest payments, and tax bills. The PBoC estimates that the earmarked RRR cut of 16 March 2020 led to a liquidity increase in the banking sector of approximately RMB 550 billion. This is equivalent to a 0.34 percentage-point cut in the standard RRR (for every 0.5 percentage-point cut, RMB 800 billion is released).[12](#fn12){ref-type="fn"} The indicators are generally the same and only differ from March 2020 onwards.Table 3Parameter estimates of the dynamic factor modelsTable 3VariablesParametersBaseline ModelAlternative Model$\Delta M_{t}$$\varphi_{1}$-0.1884 (1.3)-0.1607 (1.2)$\varphi_{2}$-0.0430 (0.3)-0.0262 (0.2)$\Delta I_{1,t}$$\beta_{1}$0.0928 (1.5)0.1028 (1.9)$\rho_{1,1}$-0.3152 (2.8)-0.3185 (3.2)$\rho_{1,2}$-0.0930 (0.9)-0.0938 (0.9)$\sigma_{1}^{2}$0.2685 (6.1)0.2665 (6.9)$\Delta I_{2,t}$$\beta_{2}$0.2161 (8.8)0.2139 (9.2)$\rho_{2,1}$0.5422 (0.3)0.1223 (0.4)$\rho_{2,2}$0.2410 (0.2)0.5909 (1.8)$\sigma_{2}^{2}$0.0026 (0.3)0.0046 (0.8)$\Delta I_{3,t}$$\beta_{3}$-0.0506 (1.1)-0.0508 (1.3)$\rho_{3,1}$-0.2734 (2.8)-0.2744 (2.9)$\rho_{3,2}$-0.1225 (1.2)-0.1253 (1.3)$\sigma_{3}^{2}$0.1287 (7.7)0.1286 (7.0)$\Delta I_{4,t}$$\beta_{4}$-0.0676 (3.9)-0.0682 (4.4)$\rho_{4,1}$0.4273 (3.9)0.4274 (4.4)$\rho_{4,2}$-0.1761 (1.6)-0.1717 (1.8)$\sigma_{4}^{2}$0.0306 (6.7)0.0306 (6.9)$\Delta I_{5,t}$$\beta_{5}$-0.0045 (1.4)-0.0053 (1.7)$\rho_{5,1}$0.4131 (4.0)0.4180 (4.2)$\rho_{5,2}$0.2512 (2.5)0.2476 (2.4)$\sigma_{5}^{2}$0.0011 (7.8)0.0011 (7.1)Log likelihood116.58116.08[^3]Figure 3Dynamic factor model - based indicators of China's monetary policy stance. **Notes:** The calculated indicator reflects monetary policy decisions taken through 30 June 2020.Figure 3

In retrospect, China's central bank has been highly interventionist. So what was the reaction to the COVID-19 shock? How pronounced is the monetary policy boost to counteract a possible COVID-19 meltdown? And what does the composite monetary policy stance indicator reveal about the economic outlook of the PBoC?

The first impression is that China's post-COVID-19 monetary policy is as expansionary as it was after the global downturn 2008-2009. However, compared with the global financial crisis, the PBoC has this time used a different policy mix. While the focus in the years following the global financial crisis was on reducing the benchmark interest rates and the RRR, this time liquidity injections and earmarked policy measures play a major role. One reason for this is the lower interest rate level that has already been achieved. In the period September to December 2008, the 1-year benchmark lending rate dropped from 7.47% to 5.31% (215-bp cut), while the 1-year loan prime rate was reduced by 30-bp from 4.15% to 3.85% in the first half-year 2020. In both crises the RRR was lowered. In the period September to December 2008, the reserve ratios for small and medium-sized banks (large banks) were reduced by 4 (2) percentage points. The RRR cut released about RMB 1,000 billion. Since February 2020, the overall RRR cut in March released long-term funding of about RMB 550 billion. Furthermore, two more targeted RRR reductions by 0.5 percentage points for small and medium banks released about RMB 400 billion liquidity. With regard to open market operations (repos and reverse repos), the gross injections were RMB 982.5 billion in the period September to December 2008, and RMB 5,080 billion in February - June 2020. Finally, in the first half-year 2020 liquidity in the amount of RMB 2,007 billion was provided by means of MLF, relending and rediscounting injections. This monetary policy instrument did not yet exist in 2008.

On the other hand, a high level of liquidity has already been injected into the banking sector prior to the COVID-19 pandemic shock. The net injection (deducting the amount of matured facilities from the gross injection) through various loan facilities (measured by the changes in PBoC's claims on the banking sector) and RRR cut was RMB 9.4 trillion between April 2018 and January 2020 (of which RMB 6.3 trillion was made until January 2019). In contrast, the PBoC's net injection during February - June 2020 was only RMB 29 billion into the banking sector. In other words, the loose monetary policy stance after the financial meltdown 2008-2009 and prior to the COVID-19 shock explains the comparatively restrained reaction at this point in time. This is consistent with the PBoC's ongoing efforts towards financial stability.

Another feature is the sequential step-by-step approach since the beginning of 2020 which is nicely illustrated by the index. This incremental approach may be due to the declining number of new domestic COVID-19 infections. Although concerns about a second wave of infection persist, the initial assessment is that the economic impact of the pandemic has been a sharp, but short, recession. It will be followed by a V-shaped recovery with a return to normal in the second half of 2020 and growth accelerating in 2021. The supply-side recovery shown in [Figure 4](#fig4){ref-type="fig"} points towards such a swift rebound as happened with China's SARS outbreak in 2003. This assessment is supported by readings of the Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), which surged to above 50 in March 2020 after hitting a record low of 35.7 in February. The seasonally adjusted month-on-month growth rates of industrial production, retail sales, and fixed asset investment also recorded rebounds of 29.6%, 0.9% and 6.2% respectively. This improvement contrasts with the contraction in the first two month of the year.Figure 4China gets back to work. **Source:** Bloomberg EconomicsFigure 4

There is another explanation for the initial restrained monetary policy response, however. The perception could have been that traditional monetary policy slashing interest rates and providing liquidity is not the solution to a virus outbreak and thus ill-advised. In a nutshell, severe viral outbreaks are not "typical recessions" due to the peculiarity of the shock the economy faces, i.e. a shock that involves both supply-side and demand-side channels. It follows that more targeted interventions show more promise in the event of a severe viral outbreak. An example of this is the earmarked measure for loans to SMEs included in the alternative indicator. From this angle, the PBoC's swift monetary policy easing propping up the coronavirus-hit Chinese economy reflects the well-understood unorthodox nature of the shock. This also explains why many measures target specific industries, avoiding a "flood-like" easing to lift all boats as in previous slowdowns. This assessment is corroborated by comparison with other countries. Despite the adopted counter-cyclical monetary policy stance aimed at creating confidence and limiting the amplification of the shock, the PBoC's course of action appears remarkably relaxed and restrained compared with the exceptional array of pandemic-fighting measures deployed around the world to prevent cascading defaults and market panic.[13](#fn13){ref-type="fn"}

As a final evaluation step, a robustness analysis shall be carried out. Despite the breadth of the dynamic factor modelling approach, a comparison with alternative approaches is interesting. [@bib50] have suggested that the McCallum rule can be a useful tool for analysing the monetary policy stance. [@bib39] has advocated a policy rule that requires central banks to target the growth rate of nominal GDP using the monetary base as its instrument. What is the course of the dynamic factor model - based indicator and the growth in the monetary base? The left panel in [Figure 5](#fig5){ref-type="fig"} shows that (i) both time series have very similar peaks and troughs; and (ii) both time series are time-shifted. For this reason, in the right panel of [Figure 5](#fig5){ref-type="fig"} the dynamic factor model - based indicator has been plotted against the 12-month lead of the growth rate of the monetary base. The alignment of the two time series shows that the dynamic factor model - based indicator is a leading indicator of the growth rate of the monetary base, with the lead amounting to 12 months.Figure 5Dynamic factor model - based indicator of Chinese monetary policy stance and the annual growth of the monetary base. **Notes:** The dynamic factor model - based indicator is the baseline indicator in [Figure 4](#fig4){ref-type="fig"}. Details could be found in notes below [Figure 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"}. Monetary base is proxied by the reserve money in PBoC's balance sheet. **Data Sources**: PBoC, National Interbank Funding Center and authors' calculation.Figure 5

5. Conclusions {#sec5}
==============

Understanding the COVID-19 policy reaction of China is critical. The sheer size of the Chinese market and China's integration into the global supply chains has made it a significant driver of global growth. For this reason, the economic policy response in China and the country\'s economic development play a key role in the global economic recovery.[14](#fn14){ref-type="fn"} Against this background, this paper analyses the PBoC's monetary policy response to counter the COVID-19 pandemic and quantifies it using a dynamic factor model.

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the dynamic factor model allows estimation of the monetary policy stance which results from China's unorthodox and earmarked mix of monetary policy instruments. Second, the established monthly indicators reveal in concise form the stepwise response of the PBoC to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic over time. Third, the paper demonstrates that the PBoC has implemented a remarkable variety of policy measures following the COVID-19 shock. Fourth, our estimates reveal that the PBoC has implemented novel policy measures to ensure that commercial banks maintain liquidity access and credit provision during the COVID-19 crisis. Fifth, the current monetary loosening is swift and decisive, but less prominent than after the global financial crisis 2008-2009. This contrasts with the radical and unique policies of many other countries to counter the COVID-19 shock. The reason is that the Chinese authorities keep an eye on containing the nation's debt pile. In particular, they still seek to rein in the exuberant credit growth. It may also be motivated by the PBoC's assessment that the recvovery from the Chinese downturn is "so far, so V". The years ahead will show the soundness of this judgement and establish that the course of action was adequate to meet these exceptional challenges.
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For the classic epidemiological model of epidemic dynamics and its domestic and international spread, see [@bib1], [@bib6], [@bib14] and [@bib52].

The economic literature on the COVID-19 pandemic is rapidly expanding. For the various facets of the COVID-19 shock and possible policy responses, see Baldwin and [@bib7], [@bib8]; [@bib2]; [@bib3]; [@bib5]; [@bib11]; [@bib12]; [@bib15]; [@bib18], [@bib19]; [@bib20]; [@bib28]; [@bib34]; and [@bib36]. [@bib38]; [@bib41]; and [@bib43] study the macroeconomic and trade effects and shock transmission of the COVID-19 pandemic. For historical lessons from previous pandemics, see [@bib9]; [@bib27]; [@bib31]; and [@bib51]. [@bib35] have developed a nowcasting COVID-19 global recession risk indicator. None of these papers focus on China.

For cross-national, cross-temporal government response trackers aiming to monitor and compare government responses to the pandemic, see the IMF COVID-19 economic response tracker at <https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19> and the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker at <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/oxford-covid-19-government-response-tracker>, which measure the stringency of the responses.

For a thorough comparison see [@bib24], pp. 18-21.

Also see <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/covid19-crisis-has-no-economic-precedent-by-carmen-reinhart-2020-03>.

The implications of this unexpected GDP growth slowdown for financial stability are difficult to assess. In 2019, the PBoC stress-tested the resilience of 30 banks under a variety of scenarios. In the then-presumed most extreme hit to the economy envisaged (growth slowing to 4.15%), 17 of the 30 commercial banks modeled would need additional capital (<http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688235/3688414/3710021/3830459/3950366/index.html>). Also see PBoC answers to journalist questions (<http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4005082/index.html>).

The rebound much depends on the development of new pharmaceuticals and vaccines. Otherwise, sustained social distancing may need to be maintained in the postpandemic period into 2022 to curb the outbreak. See [@bib33].

The gross liquidity injection via various loan facilities is calculated regardless of maturing monetary policy measures which include (i) the short-term liquidities (maturing in 7 or 14 days) of RMB 5.08 trillion through PBoC's reverse repo operations and SLF; (ii) RMB 700 billion in medium-term funding (maturing in 1 year or longer) through MLF and PSL; (iii) RMB 1.3 trillion in relending and rediscount loans actually granted by 7 July (see <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4048269/4058892/index.html>); (iv) RMB 400 billion liquidity released by two targeted 0.5-percentage-point RRR cuts for the small and medium banks in April and May respectively; and (v) RMB 550 billion in long-term funds released from the earmarked required reserve ratio (RRR) cuts of 50 to 100 basis points for loans to SME firms since 16 March.

China has made good progress in recent years in liberalising interest rates. Although the policy changeovers are not yet completed, the IMF (2017, p. 34) reached a tentative verdict already in 2017 that "the conduct of \[China's\] monetary policy increasingly resembles a standard interest-rate-based framework".

This article is not the venue for a complete review of the factor modelling approach. For worth reading contributions to the theory of dynamic factor models, see [@bib21], [@bib22], [@bib23] and [@bib45], [@bib46]. Against the background of possible pandemic-related structural breaks, it is noteworthy that factor models are rather robust to parameter instabilities. See [@bib47], pp. 1-57) and [@bib10]. For comprehensive textbook treatments see [@bib29] and [@bib17].

For understanding the calculated index, two explanatory notes must be given. (i) The fact that the index is "0" in a given month does not mean necessarily that the PBoC has assumed a neutral policy stance; and (ii) an index value of "-2" ("+2") does not mean that further monetary policy loosening (tightening) is no longer possible.

The informal and difficult-to-quantify window guidance policy is not included for either indicator. For a thorough DSGE-based analysis of China's window guidance policy, see [@bib13].

It is noteworthy that China\'s fiscal policy response to the pandemic has so far been relatively restrained by international standards. In contrast, many advanced economies have implemented substantial fiscal measures according to the principle "there is no time to lose". Corporate bailouts have been a core element. However, it must be borne in mind that China may not need such unprecedented fiscal parachutes as they are already built into the system. The predominant share of corporate loans go to state-owned firms and hence already enjoy implicit government guarantees. See the IMF policy action tracker at [https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.%20The%20Oxford%20OxCGRT%20COVID-19){#intref0065}.

Adverse growth scenarios in China will have noticeable effects on economic activity in different countries and regions due to the increasingly trade- and financially-integrated world. For the literature on the spillover effects of a slowdown in Chinese growth, see, for example, [@bib16], [@bib25], and [@bib37].

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2020.08.018>.

[^1]: **Notes:** The calculated indicator reflects monetary policy decisions taken through 16 July 2020. The dates are based on PBoC/State Council announcements in Beijing time.

[^2]: **Notes:** Q1 = First quartile (25-percentile) and Q3 = third quartile (75-percentile).

[^3]: **Note:** t-values given in parentheses.
